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AIDS Is Risky Business: Examining
the Effect of the AIDS Crisis on
Publicly Traded Companies in South
Africa and the Implications for Both
South African and U.S. Investors

ABSTRACT

The Author explores the implications of the AIDS epidemic
for South African businesses. She discusses the financial impact
of the disease on shareholder investments and what measures
can, and should, be taken by South African businesses to assess
the extent of the financial damage and to help prevent and treat
infected individuals. The Author focuses on a new listing
requirement recently passed by the Johannesburg Securities
Exchange in South Africa that requires companies to implement
corporate governance and responsible HIVIAIDS policies as a
prerequisite for listing on the Exchange. In addition, she
discusses a new "Socially Responsible Investment" index that
the Exchange has launched in an effort to enhance corporate
social accountability with regard to the disease.
The Author further analyzes the discourse surrounding
social disclosure regulations in the United States and the
potential impact the proposed regulation may have on this
discussion. She addresses the current "materiality" standard
imposed by the SEC and discusses how the new AIDS
regulation crosses the lines of both financial and social
materiality. Finally, the Author argues that the SEC can
require companies to engage in social disclosure on matters that
would be considered material to both fiscally and socially
responsible investors. In particular,AIDS reporting is a matter
of the utmost concern for the investor in international
corporations and meets the SEC's "materiality"standard. The
Author concludes that the SEC should require international
corporations in countries with high AIDS infection rates to
disclose their AIDS policies.
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I. INTRODUCTION

George Gailey, a small business owner in Botswana, is thrilled to
get a contract with Debswana, a joint venture between Botswana's
government and South African mining giant DeBeers. 1 With his
modest staff of 168 workers, he is ready and eager to begin
construction of single-sex barracks for Debswana's mining
employees. 2 Gailey, however, is surprised to learn that before he can
begin one iota of work on the project, he must demonstrate that he
has a rigorous AIDS policy in place for his small company.3 At first
Gailey sees this requirement as an expensive hassle for his modest
venture, but after losing ten employees to AIDS, he is a recent
4
convert to the idea of corporate AIDS involvement.
In South Africa, the debate rages over how much involvement
companies should be required to have in the prevention and
treatment of AIDS in their workforce. Some companies, like DeBeers,
are shouldering some of the responsibility on their own and have
enough market power to pressure smaller players into compliance as
well. Still, there are many complicated issues surrounding policies
like these. Are companies like DeBeers discriminating against
smaller contractors who cannot afford to implement rigorous AIDS
programs or who may not have a significant infection rate among
their workforce? Are AIDS programs cost-effective, and if not, should
companies nonetheless implement them in the name of social
responsibility? Where does the government's responsibility toward
infected citizens end and the responsibility of the employer begin?
What is the best way to implement an AIDS program in light of
concerns over employee privacy and human rights?

1.
Abraham McLaughlin & David S. Hauck, Doing Business in Botswana? Job
1: Get an AIDS Policy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 12, 2003, available at
www.csmonitor.com/2003/1112/pOlsO3-waof.html.
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
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The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) has answered some of
these questions in favor of affirmative obligations for employers by
requiring listed companies to document their compliance with the
King Code on Corporate Governance. 5 The Code requires that
companies report the steps they are taking toward AIDS prevention
and treatment. 6 The new listing requirement has created a stir
among South African business managers, as it marks the first time a
stock exchange has explicitly required disclosure of "social" (i.e., nonfinancial) data. The debate is ongoing over whether this constitutes a
slippery slope toward capital controls on private businesses or
whether it stands as a beacon of social responsibility in an effort to
curtail the devastating effects of AIDS on one of the world's hardest
hit communities.
Part II of this Note examines the recent history of the effect of
AIDS on South African businesses and the practical and
constitutional concerns surrounding disclosure of AIDS-related data.
Part III addresses the JSE's decision to require compliance with the
King Code and the anticipated effects on listed companies. This
section will look at the experiences of companies that are already
engaged in AIDS-related prevention and treatment programs. Part IV
will discuss the new "Socially Responsible Investment" index recently
launched by the JSE and the potential effects this may have on
businesses' attitudes toward the AIDS epidemic. Part V examines the
debate surrounding social reporting in the United States, and in
particular the proposals of Professors Cynthia Williams and David
Hess for implementing social reporting requirements. Finally, Part VI
of this Note argues that South Africa's new requirements address an
issue that should satisfy the Security and Exchange Commission's
(SEC) definition of "materiality" and, thus, the United States should
follow South Africa's lead in implementing social reporting regarding
AIDS. Specifically, the SEC should focus on international
corporations with workforces derived primarily from areas with a
high prevalence of AIDS.

5.
South Africa: Listed Companies Must Comply with King II and GRI, 60
Bus. RESPECT, (Corporate Social Responsibility), July 27, 2003, available at
www.mallenbaker.net/csr/nl/60.html [hereinafter Listed Companies Must Comply].
6.
INST. OF DIR. IN SOUTHERN AFR., EXECUTIVE
REPORT § 5.1.1 (2002) [hereinafter KING REPORT].

SUMMARY OF THE KING
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Effect of HIV/AIDS on South African Business
HIV/AIDS in South Africa has been called an "epidemic of
shattering dimensions. '7 Now the single greatest cause of death in
the country, the disease affects every facet of life, including business.8
In the decade beginning in 2000, it is projected that there will be 5.23
million AIDS deaths, 1.53 million AIDS orphans, and that average
life expectancy will drop by sixteen years. 9 Businesses in South
Africa now share the serious consequences with a country in which
roughly five million people are HIV-positive, about 11.7 percent of the
population.1 0 Four of the most prominent businesses (all diamond
and precious metal mines) in South Africa estimate that twenty-five
percent of their workforce is infected with HIV/AIDS. 11 The disease
may be increasing the cost of doing business in South Africa by as
much as eight percent. 12 One mine estimated AIDS-related death
costs are as high as U.S.$18,500 per employee hired. 13 Several mining
companies estimate losses as a result of the disease at two to five
percent of profits. 14 In light of these figures, heavy-hitting investment
banks are eager to acquire information regarding the financial
consequences of HIV/AIDS in their investment plans. 15 Deutsche
Bank, Dresdner Bank, and HSBC Holding have all expressed the
need to take this information into account in their "financial
'' 16
forecasting, asset allocation, stock selection and risk underwriting.
Rival gold-producing regions such as North America, Australia, and

7.
Rob Dorrington et al., The Impact of HIVIAIDS on Adult Mortality in
South Africa, Med. Research Council of S. Afr. 5 (2001).
8.
Michelle Rotchford Galloway, MRC Report Reveals Extent of Epidemic
AIDS: 'The Single Biggest Cause of Death,' 10 AIDS BULL. 3 (Med. Research Council of
S. Mr.), Dec. 2001, available at http://www.mrc.ac.za/aids/dec200l/mrcreport.htm (last
visited Nov. 13, 2002).
9.
John G. Culhane et al., Dealing with InternationalAIDS: A Case Study in
the Challenges of Globalization,35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 381, 393 (2002).
10.
Nicol Degli Innocenti, South Africa to Increase AIDS Funding, FIN. TIMES,
available at http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/Full
Story&c=StoryFT&cid=1066565833016&p=1012571727172 (last visited Nov. 4, 2003).
11.
Toby Heaps & Martin Whittaker, HIV/AIDS Emerges as Big Investment
Risk, GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 22, 2003.
12.
Larry Schlesinger, Businesses Count the Cost of the AIDS Epidemic,
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WKLY., Jan. 29, 2003, at 24.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
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New Zealand are looking like safer alternatives for many investors
who are worried about the costs of AIDS incurred by sub-Saharan
mines. 17 Chris Thompson, executive chairman at South Africa's Gold
Fields mine notes that "[i]t is difficult to quantify the number of
punters who have decided against buying Gold Fields shares because
of the perception of the effects of the disease on South Africa's
'1 8
workforce.
B. ReportingDebate in South Africa
Indeed, investors are increasingly insisting that companies
report on the impact of AIDS. Still, it is unclear what is the best way
to go about satisfying investors' concerns. One of the most hotly
debated issues concerning HIV/AIDS reporting is whether companies
need to take account of, or disclose, the prevalence of AIDS in the
workplace.
Acquiring the data necessary for AIDS prevalence reporting is no
simple task. The JSE lists more than 460 companies and is the
fourteenth largest stock exchange in the world. 19 In preparation for a
potential prevalence and financial cost/loss reporting requirement,
the JSE decided to assess the practicality of such a process by testing
210 volunteers from its own staff.20 Of those tested, four were HIVpositive. 21 JSE President Russell Loubser told Dow Jones Newswires
that the Exchange "wanted to go through the same sort of process
22
that other organizations will have to experience down the line.
However, the prospect of that same physical testing on such a large
scale raises potential human rights issues. Some argue that a purely
actuarial analysis would suffice to satisfy a reporting requirement.
23
But this raises many potentially unacceptable uncertainties.
Further, there are some who think that the requirements will have
an unintentional backlash against smaller players. 24 For instance,
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines for AIDS prevalence
reporting call for fairly sophisticated techniques. If required to

17.
Stewart Bailey, Gold Fields Counts the Cost of AIDS, MAIL & GUARDIAN,
July 27, 2001, available at http://www.aegis.com/news/dmg/2OO1/MG010706.html (last
visited Sept. 9, 2004).
Id.
18.
19.
Angus Macmillan, Interview: South Africa Bourse May Require HJV-AIDS
Reporting, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, Apr. 1, 2003.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra, Part II.B.I.b.
See infra, Part II.B.
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employ such materials, smaller companies may be dissuaded from
25
attempting to get listed.
1. Prevalence Reporting Processes and Concerns
a. Physical Testing
Physically testing employees for HIV/AIDS raises some explosive
human rights issues in a country with one of the newest, and perhaps
most progressive, constitutions in the world. 26 Some believe that
"compulsory AIDS prevalence testing, or even subtle pressure for
'voluntary' tests, is unconstitutional, an assault on human rights and
a contravention of labour law. '27 Section 9(3) of the South African
Constitution states that the government may not "unfairly
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone. '28
The
Constitutional Court, the highest court in the country on all
constitutional matters, whose decisions are binding on all organs of
government, 29 recently determined that an individual's HIV/AIDS30
positive status qualified as a protected ground under this section.
Under Hoffman v. South African Airways, the Court held that
impairing the dignity of another person through exclusion and
stigmatization can violate § 9(3).31 In Hoffman, South African
Airways refused to hire an HIV-positive individual solely on the basis
of his HIV-status. The Court noted the particular significance of such
a violation in the workplace, saying, "[t]he impact of discrimination
on HIV positive people is devastating. It is even more so when it
occurs in the context of employment. It denies them the right to earn
'3 2
a living.
As a further hindrance to physical testing, § 7(2) of the
Employment Equity Act prohibits testing an employee for HIV/AIDS
unless the Labour Court specifically authorizes such a test under §

25.
26.

Listed Companies Must Comply, supra note 5.
Culhane et al., supra note 9, at 406.

27.

Effective AIDS Reporting Won't Infringe Rights, S. AFRICAN PRESS ASS'N,

Sept. 19, 2002 at
6, available at 2002 WL 26632799 [hereinafter Reporting Won't
Infringe Rights].
28.
S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9 (Constitution Act 108, 1996) available at
www.concourt.gov.za/constitution/const02.html#27 (n.d.).
29.
Information About the Constitutional Court of South Africa, Wits Law
School, at www.concourt.gov.za/about.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
30.
Culhane et al., supra note 9, at 407.
31.
2000 (11) BCLR 1211, 1235 (CC), available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/
judgments/2000/saa.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
32.
Id. at 28.
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50(4) of that Act. 33 The strict constitutional requirements against
HIV/AIDS discrimination, along with the stringent requirements for
compulsory HIV-testing in the workplace, make compulsory physical
testing of a company's workforce an unlikely option.
Voluntary testing may prove more workable. Physical tests have
become much more feasible and inexpensive in recent years. 34 Today,
many companies perform saliva tests, which are minimally invasive
and cost only about three or four dollars for each employee. 35 The
tests are voluntary and anonymous, so neither employee nor
employer can find out who tests positive. 36 This anonymity is
especially important, as many employees fear that they will be fired if
37
found to have HTV.
b. Actuarial Projection
Some have suggested the use of actuarial projections for
assessing the impact of AIDS on a particular workforce. 38 Proponents
of this method argue that physical HIV tests would not be necessary
to fulfill an HIV/AIDS prevalence reporting requirement. These
individuals think that an actuarial analysis would suffice to predict
accurately the prevalence of AIDS among any given group. Applying
estimates to a particular workforce is a less expensive way of
39
assessing the impact of AIDS, but is arguably also less reliable.
Andrew Sykes of NMG-LEVY, Employee Benefits Consultants, states
"in South Africa, HIV/AIDS has progressed to such a stage over such
a long period that costs and consequences can be accurately
predicted. .

.

. [R]eports and projections derived in this way would

give shareholders an accurate assessment of present and future
costs."40 To predict accurately the future financial impact of AIDS on
South African business, the South African Actuarial Society is
working on developing formulas that will incorporate as much data as
possible. 41 The hope is that an accurate prediction can be made that

33.
Employment Equity Act, 1998, Act 55 in GG19370 of 19 October 1998,
available at http://www.parliament.gov.za/acts/1998/a55-98.htm (last visited Nov. 13,
2003).
34.
Sydney Rosen et al., AIDS is Your Business, HARv. Bus. REV., Feb. 2003, at
81.
Id. at 83.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
8, 11.
Reporting Won't Infringe Rights, supra note 27,
38.
Rosen et al., supra,note 34, at 83.
39.
8, 11.
Reporting Won't Infringe Rights, supra note 25,
40.
41.

Larry

Schlesinger,

Social Reporting: The

True

Cost of AIDS, FIN.

DIRECTOR, May 12, 2002, available at http://www.financialdirector.co.uk/Features/
1131788 (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
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will satisfy investors' need for risk assessment without infringing on
the human rights of individual employees.
Even the best projections, however, may not give an accurate
picture of the prevalence of AIDS because of some inherent flaws in
the data-gathering structure. 42 Currently, the vast majority of data
regarding the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in South Africa come from
testing pregnant women who visit public prenatal clinics. 43 By
contrast, the companies that are affected most by the disease, the
mines, are staffed almost exclusively by men. 44 Although the
projections of AIDS prevalence stemming from the prenatal clinic
data have been consistent with mortality rates, there are some critics
of the method and its accuracy. 45 Prevalence ratios need to be
adjusted for individual companies because infection rates vary by
gender, age, income, education, and living conditions. 46 For instance,
a mining company at which predominantly male employees inhabit
single-sex barracks far from their families is going to encounter
higher prevalence rates because of the increased Use of commercial
sex workers and promiscuity. 47 As one writer notes, "[o]ne of the
problems with reporting the prevalence of AIDS is that it gives only a
snapshot in time of the situation in a company and does not show the
level of sickness and absenteeism of infected staff, nor does it show
' 48
which critical posts are affected, or what future levels might be."
Willem Punt, Business Ethics Manager for the Ethics Institute of
South Africa, believes actuarial figures would simply not satisfy a
prevalence reporting requirement. 49 He advocates tackling the
constitutional issues of confidentiality and informed consent head-on
in order to garner accurate data.50 "For the JSE to consider [AIDS
reporting] as a listing requirement a number of constitutional issues
regarding confidentiality and informed consent need to be worked
out.... To make proper assessments you need proper data. You need
to be able to test workers according to an opt-out routine testing
51
programme."
Despite the arguments against actuarial projection, current
constitutional law will not permit employers to mandate AIDS testing

42.
Id.
43.
Culhane et al., supra note 9, at 390.
44.
Rosen et al., supra note, 34 at 85.
45.
Schlesinger, supra note 41.
46.
Rosen et al., supra note, 34 at 83-84.
47.
Id. at 84.
48.
Id.
49.
E-mail from Willem Punt, Business Ethics Manager, Ethics Institute of
South Africa, to Martha Salomon, 2005 J.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt University Law
School (Nov. 25, 2003, 09:11:00 CST) (on file with author).
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
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for their employees. 52 Loubser noted that if the JSE is unable to
determine the prevalence of the disease, disclosure of its cost would
be pointless. 53 The shift is now toward voluntary disclosure by
employees, which, it is hoped, will become more prevalent with
time. 54 In fact, it is believed that many companies already know the
prevalence figures among their workforce but are reluctant to disclose
the information for fear that their stock prices will plummet. 55 One
recent study suggests that employers can achieve eighty percent
participation in voluntary testing if they "launch awareness
campaigns; involve employee trade unions, and staff associations in
planning surveys; and share results with all employees" in order to
encourage participation. 56
2. Constitutional Concerns
a. Discrimination
Incorporating AIDS-related costs into financial reports is also a
daunting monetary risk for many companies, especially the mines.
'The problem is that in Africa, where companies are not permitted to
test, fire or screen out workers for HIV-AIDS, it is difficult to keep a
sick worker away from work if he is desperate for money and gets
paid for punching in his card. '57 The constitutional prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of HIV-status puts companies in a
particular quandary when it comes to reporting. The loss of profits
because of AIDS-related deaths is now a seemingly unavoidable risk
to South African companies. 58 Now, to add insult to injury, investors
may be deterred from buying shares in a company with a high
prevalence of AIDS because of the long-term costs associated with the
disease.

59

b. Constitutional Health Care Guarantees
Punt notes that foreign investors will likely be especially
reluctant to pay for health services for which the state is ultimately
responsible. 60 Especially in light of the current administration's

Vernon Wessels, JSE Will Not Demand HIVDisclosure, Bus. REPORT., July
52.
4, 2003, at front page.
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
Rosen et al., supra note 34, at 83.
56.
Heaps & Whittaker, supra note 11, 7.
57.
See generally Rosen et al., supra note 34.
58.
See supra Part H.A.
59.
Punt, supra note 49.
60.

2004]

AIDS IS RISKY BUSINESS

1483

arguable foot-dragging in terms of making Highly Active AntiRetroviral Therapy (HAART) and other treatments available to its
61
citizens, this issue has the potential to be very politically charged.
Further complicating all of these issues is the affirmative
guarantee in the South African Constitution that every citizen has a
right of access to health care. 62 Many would persuasively argue that
it is thus the obligation of the state, not private companies, to address
the AIDS problem and fund treatment for affected individuals. Even
if companies decide it is in their economic interest to provide
treatment for their employees, it is not clear, then, if they should also
feel compelled to provide drugs to the employees' spouses and
families. 63 Further, will investors balk at a company's assumption of
what may be categorized as a state responsibility? 64 The Ethics
Institute of South Africa lends its qualified support to a reporting
regulation, provided that investors (and particularly, foreign
investors) are made aware of the social and financial complexities
65
surrounding the issue.
South Africa's Constitution mandates that "[tihe state must take
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these
rights. '66 Grootboom v. South Africa was the Constitutional Court's
first opportunity to sort out the handling of these ambitious
affirmative guarantees. 6 7 That case involved the right of indigent
people to adequate housing.68 The Court there found that the
government did, in fact, have an affirmative obligation to make sure
that each of its citizens had reasonable housing. 69 This case marked
a shift in understanding the language of the South African
Constitution as more than just lofty aspirations, but as tangible
promises. The Court in Khosa v. Minister of Social Development noted
that these affirmative obligations are limited by the ability of the
government to meet the need, stating "[t]he rights to life, dignity and
equality.., have to be taken into account along with the availability
of human and financial resources in determining whether the state
70
has complied with the constitutional standard of reasonableness."

61.
Id.
62.
S. AFR. CONST. supra note 28, § 27.
63.
Punt, supra note 49.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at (2).
67.
Case No: CCT 38/00, Constitutional Court, Sept. 21, 2000, available at
http://www.concourt.gov.za/files/grootboon/grootboom.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2004).
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
Case No: CCT 12/03, Constitutional Court, Mar. 4, 2004, available at
http://www.concourt.gov.zalfiles/khosa/khosa.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2004).
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South Africa's government has taken its first major step in the
realization of these constitutional promises-including the promise of
access to health care-with its declaration in August 2003 that it
would provide HAART to all AIDS-infected citizens. 71 It remains to be
seen whether the government's goals will be realized in a timely
fashion. Further, § 27(2) of the Constitution limits the right to the
government's ability to meet the need: "The state must take
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these
rights. '7 2 In the meantime, many companies are feeling pressured to
fill in the coverage gaps and implement health care programs of their
own. In Gold Fields' 2003 annual report, the company detailed its
commitment to providing HAART to infected workers, but mentioned
that the government's recent announcement regarding the provision
of the therapy to infected citizens was, indeed, "welcome. '73 In that
same report, Gold Fields offered a glimpse into the tension that exists
between the role of the employer and that of the government:
The most pressing challenge facing both South Africa and Gold Fields
remains the development of a credible, comprehensive, nationallyavailable and sustainable response to the prevention of HIV infection
and the treatment, care and support of people affected by HIV/AIDS.
74
This requires political will, commitment, initiative and leadership.

It is hoped that the government will truly be able to realize its
promise of HAART and that the resources will be able to sustain the
demand, although this remains to be seen.

III. THE JOHANNESBURG STOCK EXCHANGE'S NEW LISTING
REQUIREMENT

The Johannesburg Stock Exchange has recognized the need to
keep shareholders apprised of the impact of HIV/AIDS on their
investments. In response, the Exchange has implemented a new
listing requirement pursuant to which companies must give investors
some feedback in this regard, but need not go as far as engaging in
prevalence reporting.
The Financial Services Board (FSB) is the governing body in
South Africa that oversees the JSE, as well as the other major stock

71.
Reuters, AIDS Behind Big Jump in S. Africa Deaths (Mar. 3, 2004),
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4438421.
72.
S. AFR. CONST., supra note 28, § 27(2)(emphasis added).
73.

available

GOLD FIELDS LIMITED, 2003 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT REPORT 22-25,

at

http://www.gold-fields.com/SustainableDevelopment/sd-report03/pdf/

complete-sd~report.pdf [hereinafter GFL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT REPORT].

74.

Id. at 25.
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exchanges. 75 The FSB has given the president of the JSE the ability
to him ... any
to "disclose
to require listed companies
which is in
issuer
[the]
of
the
affairs
to...
information... pertaining
that
to
disclose
issuer
such
requires
.
.
.
the public interest and
'76
Russell
securities.
the
of
holders
registered
the
information to
Loubser, the JSE's current president, has decided that information
pertaining to the public interest includes AIDS data, as evidenced by
the Exchange's new listing requirements.
A. The King Code
The new requirements, released in September 2003, require
companies to disclose the extent of their compliance with the King
77
At
Code on Corporate Governance (hereinafter, King Code).
but
companies
mandatory,
are
Code
King
of
the
parts
only
present,
are still required to document their compliance with King Code
principles. 78 Most of the mandatory King Code provisions deal with
7 9
ensuring that a company's board of directors is truly independent.
The move by the JSE to require listed companies to document
compliance with the King Code "puts the JSE at the extreme of stock
exchanges requiring compliance with governance and social
principles." 80 The JSE sees the adoption of the new standards as a
tribute to its strict intolerance of corporate mismanagement:
The JSE played a crucial role in raising the bar on corporate
governance standards during the year under review. Not only did it
provide valuable input into the formulation of the King II Code on
Corporate Governance, it is the only exchange in the world to have
adopted a code of this nature as part of its listings requirements. This
means all JSE listed companies must abide by the King Code, or

See Welcome to the FSB, Financial Services Board, at http://www.fsb.co.za
75.
(last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
Stock Exchanges Control Act of 1985 § 19(1)(a) (West 2004). The court
76.
states in relevant part that
[t]he president may, by notice in writing, require any issuer whose securities
are included in the list referred to in section 16 (a) to disclose to him, within a
period specified in such notice, any information at such issuer's disposal
pertaining to such securities or to the affairs of that issuer which is in the
public interest and, after giving such issuer an opportunity of making
representations to him, require such issuer to disclose that information to the
registered holders of the securities specified in the said notice.
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77.
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Amendments to the JSE Securities Exchange South Africa Listings Requirements 2003,
at 7, available at http://www.icsa.co.zalassets/downloads/amendments.
Id. at 1.
78.
Id. at 7-8.
79.
Listed CompaniesMust Comply, supra note 5.
80.
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provide valid reasons for lapses. The benefits of this are already evident
in improved reporting standards and a growing recognition by
companies that they are answerable not just to shareholders, but also
to employees, customers, creditors, communities and the broader
society.

81

One of a company's King Code reporting responsibilities under
the new listing requirements includes complying with the section on
"Sustainability Reporting. '8 2 This section of the King Code calls for
the disclosure of certain non-financial information, including,
specifically, "the nature and extent of the strategy, plan and policies
adopted to address and manage the potential impact of HIV/AIDS on
the company's activities. '8 3 While the King Code requires a company
to report at least once a year on its social, transformation, ethical,
safety, health, and environmental policies, 84 it leaves it to the board
of each company to decide what it deems relevant for disclosure in
"regard to the company's particular circumstances. '8 5 Further, listed
companies do not have to take any prescribed action; rather,
companies are only required to document to what extent they are
responding to the AIDS epidemic in their workplace.
The King Code was drafted in the wake of (and in reaction to)
the Enron and WorldCom calamities in the United States, along with
some of South Africa's own collapses of companies like Leisurenet and
Regal Bank.8 6 While the U.S. Congress responded with the SarbanesOxley Act, South Africa developed the King Code. The operation of
the King Code becomes effective through the JSE's decision to make
documentation of compliance with its provisions a requirement for
listing on the Stock Exchange. This differs from Sarbanes-Oxley,
which garners compliance through the threat of legal sanctions. 87 Not
everyone agrees that such self-censoring techniques will be effective.
Said the Cape Town-based Frater Asset Management's William
Frater, "[wihile one system promotes the employment of an army of
lawyers to find the best possible ways around a plethora of laws, the
other involves employing an army of consultants to address how the
principles will be best applied to an organization." 88

81.
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Review of Operations, available at
http://www.jse.co.za (n.d.).
82.
KING REPORT, supra note 6, § 5.1.4.
83.
Id.
84.
Id. § 5.1.1.
85.
Id.
86.
William Baue & Graham Sinclair, Johannesburg Securities Exchange
Requires Compliance with King 11 and Global Reporting Initiative, SOCIALFUNDS.com,
July 16, 2003, at http://www.socialfunds.com/news/print.cgi?sfArticleId=1174 (last
visted Sept. 8, 2004).
87.
Id.
88.
Id.

AIDS IS RISKY BUSINESS

2004J

1487

B. Global Reporting Index
The Code further specifies that the disclosure of data must be
made in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)
guidelines, which were developed in order to "disseminate globally
89
South Africa is
applicable Sustainability Reporting Guidelines."
which, it is
guidelines,
GRI
new
these
for
site
acting as the pilot
reporting
AIDS
international
as
the
recognized
be
soon
hoped, will
90
companies
African
South
ten
only
2003,
July
of
As
standard.
followed the GRI guidelines in full. 91 Others criticized the GRI's strict
standards for "placing the bar too high. '92 Now that the JSE has
mandated that listed companies comply with the GRI, these critiques
are likely to rise to a feverish pitch. The GRI guidelines represent an
attempt by that organization to facilitate standardized reporting of a
company's AIDS policies and programs in order to allow for public
93
inspection of the adequacy of the corporate response to the disease.
94
Under the GRI's guidelines, there are four performance indicators:
1)
2)
3)
4)

Good Governance: policy formulation, strategic planning, effective
risk management, stakeholder involvement
Measurement, Monitoring and Evaluation: prevalence and
incidence of HIV/AIDS, actual and estimated costs and losses
Workplace Conditions and HIV/AIDS Management
DepthlQuality/Sustainability of HLV/AIDS Programs

Under the "Measurement, Monitoring and Evaluation" heading, the
reporting guidelines indicate that companies should describe the
current and projected prevalence of HIV/AIDS in their workforce and
"relevant populations" (e.g., service providers, target consumers,
etc.). 9 5 Under that heading, a company must also disclose its current
96
Although the
and projected costs and losses caused by the disease.
GRI's guidelines include an alternative "Basic-Level Indicators"
reporting guide for "first time reporters in small or low-capacity
organizations," even this bare-bones reporting document calls for
prevalence and cost/loss documentation. 9 7 As discussed above in Part

at
Initiative,
Reporting
Global
Glance,
a
at
GRI
89.
http://www.globalreporting.org/test/brief.asp (last visited Sept. 19, 2004).
SA is Pilot Site for HIV/AIDS Global Reporting Initiative, CAPE ARGUS,
90.
May 1, 2003 [hereinafter Pilot Site].
Listed Companies Must Comply, supra note 5.
91.
Id.
92.
GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, REPORTING GUIDANCE ON HIV/AIDS: A GRI
93.
available at http://www.globalreporting.org/
6 (2003),
DOCUMENT
RESOURCE

guidelines/HIV/HIVAIDSpilot.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
Id. at 9.
94.
95.

Id. at 11.

96.
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Id.
Id. at 16.
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II.B, the reporting of prevalence rates and financial costs of the
disease evokes many concerns among affected businesses. Further,
some fear that the ambitious nature of the GRI reporting indicators
requires such costly and advanced processes that it might scare off
small or medium-sized companies that have not implemented
8s
HIV/AIDS-related policies and prefer to operate "under the radar. 9
Ultimately, the practical concerns about determining prevalence
in the workplace won out over those insisting that such reporting was
necessary. As of this writing, the JSE has decided against requiring
companies to report specifically on prevalence rates and the financial
costs of HIV/AIDS to a company. The softer line taken by the JSE,
requiring only that a company report its own self-assessment of
compliance with the King Code, may give way in the future, however,
to a more stringent reporting requirement. The South African
Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) is currently working on
an actuarial system that would allow companies to assess prevalence
rates without physical testing. 99 This would also allow companies to
forecast the financial costs of the disease with a greater degree of
certainty.
C. Is Disclosure Good for Business?
The new listing requirements are undoubtedly going to cause
some dissatisfaction among companies. First of all, the regulations
may be preclusive for some smaller companies wanting to make it on
to the Exchange. 00 Second, there are sure to be companies that do
not feel that AIDS risk management is a significant concern in their
industry. 10 ' These companies may fear being viewed as "bad" if they
do not take the same measures as their colleagues on the
Exchange.102

Linda de Beer, a SAICA technical director, developed the
disclosure requirements that the JSE adopted.' 0 3 De Beer
understands that the regulations are a "tall order" for affected
management, but stresses that these issues are too important to be
ignored.' 0 4 She also emphasizes that the extent of the disclosure will

98.
Baue & Sinclair, supra note 86.
99.
Sanchia Temkin, HIV/AIDS Poses Information Disclosure Challenges, BUS.
DAY (South Africa), Mar. 10, 2003, at 7.
100.
Pilot Site, supra note 90.
101.
Andy Smith et al., HIV/AIDS Risk, GIBS NEWS, Feb. 3, 2004, available at
http://www.gibs.co.za/newsevents/news/fullstories/hiv.htm.
102.
David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate
Social Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41, 80 (1999) (stating that many corporations may
resist social reporting for fear of being labeled as "good" or "evil").
103.
Temkin, supra note 99; see also Pilot Site, supra note 90.
104.
Temkin, supra note 99.
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vary from company to company, acknowledging that different
companies have different levels of risk. 0 5 While the new listing
requirements do not specifically require compulsory AIDS reporting
(the current version requires only the identification of the key risks of
AIDS to business sustainability), that is indeed what the JSE initially
had in mind. As a result, some fear that soon all listed companies will
be required to include the cost of AIDS on their financial
statements.106
1. The Cost of Implementing HIV/AIDS Programs
Another debate surrounding the new listing requirement is
whether it will ultimately hurt or help South African businesses with
workforces that are dramatically affected by the AIDS crisis. The
JSE listing requirements are a unique mix of both financial and
social accountability.' 0 7 The driving force behind these regulations is
pressure from big investment firms concerned with the long-term
financial forecasts of listed companies.' 0 8 This concern is fueled by
the rationale that "the health of a company's workforce is intertwined
with the well-being of the company."' 1 9 Also included in the
guidelines, however, is the requirement of a detailed narrative of how
a company is managing the AIDS crisis in its workplace, in terms of
both prevention and treatment. 11° Although such disclosure is
undoubtedly social in nature, these measures will surely have some
form of financial impact (whether good or bad) on listed companies.
Some companies have already come to the conclusion that disclosures
that may appear to detract from the bottom line will be looked upon
favorably by a so-called "ethical investor." ' These forward-looking
companies have already implemented prevention and treatment
measures.
For example, in an effort to reduce the at-risk sexual behavior
that occurs as a result of migrant labor and all-male hostels typically
used by mining companies to house their workers, one mine in
Tanzania has implemented a home ownership plan under which its

105.
Id.
Firms Warned of High Cost of AIDS, Bus. DAY, Oct. 6, 2003, available at
106.
17, 2004)
(last visited Nov.
http://www.journ-aids.org/reports/06102003.htm
[hereinafter Warned].
107.
Temkin, supra note 99.
108.
See Heaps & Whittaker, supra note 11.
109.
Macmillan, supra note 19, 4.
110.
Schlesinger, supra note 41.
111.
Cynthia Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1267 (1999).
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employees can buy homes closer to work. 112 Such a measure is not
without financial cost to the company, but the social goodwill may
outweigh the detrimental affect to the bottom line, at least in the
minds of some investors. Perhaps most notably, several companies
have begun offering free HAART to their workforce. 113 Mining giant
Anglo American, for example, is currently offering HAART to all of its
30,000 infected employees. 114 The treatment plan will cost $3 million,
but as Brian Brink, the head of Anglo's medical program, says, "with
earnings of about $1.7 billion, it's not going to kill us-it will protect
US."ll15

Gold Fields, another of South Africa's key mining companies,
started reporting the cost of AIDS of its own volition in 2001.116 After
responding to an array of questions from wary investors and realizing
that AIDS has become an "increasing high-profile item on investor
agendas," the company implemented AIDS assessment and
117
prevention reports well in advance of the just-passed regulation.
Included in the Gold Fields program are different formulas for
counting the future cost of AIDS depending on the success or failure
of its "life extension" campaigns. 1 18
Recent data show that investing in prevention and treatment
plans may ultimately be good for a company's portfolio. 119 A recent
study evaluated the so-called "AIDS tax" that a group of six large subSaharan companies incurred as a result of AIDS among their
respective workforces. 120 The "tax" ranged from 0.4 percent of the
121
company's annual payout of salaries to 5.9 percent of the payout.
For half of the companies surveyed, prevention programs (such as
providing condoms, education, voluntary testing, and treatment for
other STDs that increase risk of HIV transmission) proved
profitable. 122 Most striking, the study found that providing HAART at
no cost to employees would produce positive returns for all companies
involved. 123 It is worth noting that all of the companies involved in

112.
Heaps & Whittaker, supra note 11 (discussing steps taken at Barrick Gold,
one of Africa's most prominent mines).
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
Id.
116.
Bailey, supra note 17.
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
119.
See generally Rosen et al., supra note 34.
120.
Id. at 84.
121.
Id. at 86.
122.
Id. at 87. It should be noted that the study authors believed the programs
would have produced positive returns for all of the companies studied if all
organizational costs of the epidemic had been counted. Id.
123.
Id.
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this study were large by sub-Saharan standards. 124 While the
companies opted to remain anonymous for the study, it is likely that
similar results would be reached using those companies large enough
to be listed on the JSE.
Companies that have already implemented prevention and
treatment plans like these will likely support the disclosure
requirement, as the costs incurred are already reflected in their
financial statements. In fact, about thirty percent of listed companies
already voluntarily disclose their HIV/AIDS commitments. 125 In fact,
one of the most compelling arguments for making the disclosures
mandatory is the "peer pressure" that would be applied to those
companies that are shirking their perceived social obligations. As JSE
President Russell Loubser observes, some employers are still "closing
their eyes to the issue . . .[and] haven't even started doing anything
about HIV-AIDS.' 12 6 Mike Murphy, a facilitator of the HIV/AIDS
program of the GRI, noted that "[olnce more companies start
reporting, questions will be asked about companies which say
nothing."'127 While this "peer pressure" can be a force for good, the
Ethics Institute of South Africa stresses that it is important for
companies to treat AIDS reporting seriously, and not merely as a
128
piece of literature in their year-end statements.
Those who are involved in preventive and treatment plans
acknowledge that altruism is not the only motivator. 129 Companies
are as conscious of the dollar value of such measures as they are of
the goodwill they yield. Placer Dome, which has only one mine in
South Africa, is also initiating a family housing plan and keeps its
5,500 South African miners in constant supply of condoms. 13 While
acknowledging that there is a cost to inaction, a spokeswoman for the
company implied that the financial gains of the program were not
sufficient to outweigh the expenditures, saying "it's one mine out of
seventeen for us, so part of the motivation is to protect our
13 1
reputation."'
2. Gold Fields: An Example of AIDS Reporting at Work
Companies that were already engaging in some sort of
prevention and reporting have found compliance with the regulation

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 84.
Heaps & Whittaker, supra note 11.
Macmillan, supra note 19,
14-15.
Wessels, supra note 52.
Punt, supra note 49.
Heaps & Whittaker, supra note 11.
Id.
Id.
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to be fairly simple. Mining giant Gold Fields is listed on both the JSE
and NYSE. 132 In its 2003 annual report, the company detailed its
approach toward the AIDS epidemic in compliance with the King
Code and the new JSE regulation.' 3 3 Gold Fields adopted an actuarial
model in order to assess the prevalence of AIDS, finding about thirty
percent of its workforce to be infected.' 3 4 It then outlined its strategy
for dealing with AIDS in accordance with the regulation's treatment
and prevention disclosure requirements.
On the prevention front, Gold Fields has employed peer
educators who teach the virtues of abstinence, monogamy, and
protected sex. 135 Counseling and treatment for those infected with
STDs are also available, as an active STD can often facilitate the
transmission of AIDS. 136 Also integral in Gold Fields' strategy is a
program called "Informed, Consented, Voluntary Counseling and
Testing" (ICVCT). 137 Though current participation among its
employees in ICVCT languishes around eight percent, the company is
aiming to increase that figure to seventy percent by the end of
2004.138
On the treatment front, Gold Fields has established wellness
clinics throughout its mines. The company has also committed to
providing HAART to infected employees and to "a responsible and
compassionate ill-health retirement programme" for employees who
are no longer able to contribute to the workforce because of AIDS.

IV. THE

SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT INDEX

The JSE took another step toward accountability among listed
companies in the area of AIDS with the establishment of the Socially
Responsible Investment index (SRI). The new index is a response to
the increased demand by investors to be apprised of a company's
socially relevant activity. 139 Specifically, the index consists of
companies that have demonstrated social responsibility in the three
pillars of what is called the "triple bottom line": environmental,
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economic, and social sustainability1 40 HIV/AIDS falls under the
pillar of social sustainability, and the JSE stresses the need to
emphasize how a company is "managing the impact of the HIV/AIDS
pandemic on [its] activities."'14 1 In order to be included on the index, a
company must first complete an application detailing its policies and
programs relating to the specific criteria related to each pillar, along
with reasonable targets for the future and a plan for reaching
them.' 42 In the area of AIDS management, a company must identify
the "policies and strategies in place to identify and manage the
impact of HIV/AIDS on the company's activities" and must
"documentf initiatives or programmes to address the impact of
HIV/AIDS."'1 43 A company's social sustainability reporting must also
demonstrate that its policy includes a commitment to allowing
shareholders to be involved in social issues "when relevant" and
disclosing to the public key shareholder issues.144 The questionnaire
specifically asks the company to answer the following questions
relevant to its management of AIDS:
Does the company have dedicated capacity for managing the AIDS
risk to the organization as well as preparedness and contingency
planning in light of anticipated HIV/AIDS impacts?
Provide an estimated cost associated with the impact of HIV/AIDS
on the company's workforce as both a percentage of annual
remuneration costs and as a percentage of annual turnover.
(Please consider replacement costs of staff training and retraining,
cost of non-production due to absence related illness, time off to
attend funerals, time off to look after sick family members).
Describe what steps are being taken to communicate the HIV/AIDS
policy and strategy to the workforce and other stakeholders (nongovernmental organizations, government, labour, aid and funding
organizations, and shareholders).
State whether the organization has determined its prevalence rate
(number or proportion of infected people at any given moment) and
incidence rate (refers to the rate of increase or decrease in the
prevalence).
What steps have been taken to minimise the impacts of these
prevalence rates on the organization, such as the provision of Anti
Retro-Viral
Therapy, Voluntary
Counseling
and Testing
programmes and other medication and wellness programs.
Is the provisioning through medical aid benefits or through state
healthcare provisioning? If no such steps are being taken, please
explain.
Specify what benefits and support HIV/AIDS employees or the
families of deceased employees could expect (such as income during

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 15.
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temporary absence, disability benefits, ongoing medical aid or
health care, family support (such as, education and housing,
145
funeral costs, death benefits).

Upon completion, the answers to these questions and others
under each pillar are reviewed and scored. Application to the SRI is
optional, and only those applicants who achieve a high enough score
will be listed on the index. 146 The new SRI index was launched in
May 2004 and, of the seventy-four companies that applied, fifty-one
scored high enough to secure a place on the index. 14 7 Although the
index is still in its infancy, initial results are encouraging. Some
prominent businesses have elected to participate in the index; Anglo
American, Gold Fields, SABMiller, and Woolworths Holdings are
among the key participants. 148 The "peer pressure" effect of having
such noteworthy businesses on the SRI is an anticipated, and desired,
response. The JSE hopes that by initiating the index, and by
measuring shareholder enthusiasm for investing in companies listed
on the index, other companies will be encouraged to apply. In hopes of
scoring high enough for inclusion, these companies will likely develop
AIDS programs and may even begin some form of prevalence
reporting.149
Still, there is a legitimate concern that smaller companies will
not be able to handle the financial burden that comes with complying
with the "three pillars." Corli le Roux, assistant legal counsel for the
JSE, says in response that "[a] black mark will not be brought against
companies that do not comply with all the requirements to make the
index. But the debate needs to start happening and companies need
to address issues that will impact on long-term sustainability."'150
While the Exchange itself will not impose any tangible sanctions on
firms that do not engage in disclosure, it remains to be seen whether
investors will respond negatively to firms that do not engage in the
type of sustainability reporting envisioned by JSE. Further, the fiftyone currently listed companies include seventeen members of the
MidCap Index and three SmallCap members. 15 1 The inclusion of
these smaller players on the index demonstrates that the
requirements may not be cost-prohibitive.

145.
Johannesburg Securities Exchange, JSE SRI Index Questionnaire §§ 6.2.16.2.7 available at http://www.jse.co.za (last visited Sept. 23, 2004).
Press Release, Johannesburg Securities Exchange, Launch of JSE Socially
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Sept. 23, 2004).
147.
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See id.
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The new SRI index is another way in which the JSE is
encouraging corporate accountability in the area of AIDS response. It
is too early to tell how investors will respond to the index, but the
enthusiastic participation of a wide cross-section of South African
businesses is an encouraging sign that others will likely follow suit. It
is important that the new index will provide companies with a clear
indication of investors' concern with their response to the disease. If
investors respond favorably to the SRI, companies will be more likely
to address AIDS in their workplaces simply because it is good for
business, not because it is an unwelcome and burdensome obligation.

V. SociAL REPORTING DEBATE

There are currently no regulations in the United States that
require companies to make disclosures of a purely social nature to
their shareholders. Some scholars have, however, maintained that
social reporting requirements can and should be implemented by the
SEC. One of these scholars, Professor Cynthia Williams, argues that
social data meets the "materiality" requirement mandated by the
SEC. Professor David Hess agrees and provides a detailed plan for
how such a reporting requirement might be implemented in the
United States.
A. What Is "Materiality"?
1. SEC Disclosure Rules and the Need for Reform
In the United States, reporting of non-financial data by publicly
traded companies is a topic that has been widely debated. The SEC is
empowered, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934152
(hereinafter, 1934 Act), to require that companies disclose all
information "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors" in their proxy statements. 153 Publicly traded
companies in the United States are required by the SEC to make
continued disclosures throughout the year through their periodic
quarterly and annual reports, in their proxy statements, and when a
major corporate event occurs. 15 4 Regulation S-K 15 5 details what a
company must disclose in terms of five categories. 156 Some of the
criteria listed for specific disclosure provide the company with clear

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (2004).
15 U.S.C. § 78(n).
15 U.S.C. 7819(b)(1), 781(g)(1), 78m, 78o(d) (2004).
17 C.F.R. 229.10-229.702 (2004).
17 C.F.R. 229.10-229.702
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guidelines for when a particular item must be reported. 157 For
instance, Item 103 specifically dictates that, in an environmental
proceeding against a governmental entity, any litigation involving the
possibility of a $100,000 fine must be disclosed. 158 Where the
regulations do not detail the precise threshold for disclosure, items
'5 9
need only be disclosed if they are "material."'
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted "materiality" to mean
that the information creates a "substantial likelihood that a
reasonable investor would deem the information significant in the
total mix of information."'160 This "total mix" test has been further
endorsed by the SEC itself in its Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No.
99 on 'Materiality.' 16 1 This SAB was issued to debunk a rumor
promulgated by .corporate auditors' "rules of thumb" that no duty to
report attached (i.e., an item was not considered "material") unless it
resulted in more than a five percent misstatement of financial
accounts. 162 In dispelling such a strict numerical threshold, the SEC
stated:
In the context of a misstatement [or omission] of a financial statement
item, while the "total mix" includes the size in numerical or percentage
terms of the misstatement, it also includes the factual context in which
the user of financial statements would view the financial statement
item. The shorthand in the accounting and auditing literature for this
analysis is that financial management and the auditor must consider
both "quantitative" and "qualitative" factors in assessing an item's
63
materiality.1

While case law and bulletins like these may open up the possibility of
reporting social data if deemed relevant in the "total mix" of
information, there is still a need for clarification as to what this
definition means. Some groups have been steadily working on
proposals that would clarify a corporation's disclosure obligations
under the SEC.
The Corporate Sunshine Working Group (CSWG) is composed of
public interest organizations and investors.16 4 This group since 1998
has been advocating more extensive disclosure of non-financial data

157.
See Williams, supra note 111 at 1208.
158.
Id. (discussing 17 C.F.R. 229.103).
See 17 C.F.R. 229.10-229.702.
159.
160.
T.S.C. Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
161.
SEC, SAB No. 99-Materiality, available at http://www.sec.gov/interpsl
account/sab99.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
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Id.
163.
Id.
164.
Michelle Chan-Fishel, After Enron: How Accounting and SEC Reform can
Promote Corporate Accountability While Restoring Public Confidence, 32 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10965, 10968 (2002).
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and has issued a proposal outlining suggested disclosure rules. 165 The
CSWG's proposal suggests some new guidelines along with some
modifications to the reporting instructions, or materiality standards,
of existing ones. 166 The proposal suggests disclosure of several "Good
Actor Indicators," among them, "company-adopted human rights,
including standards and codes including brief description of internal
and external monitoring mechanisms."'1 67 Other interesting additions
include
disclosure
of corporate
contributions
to
political
organizations, number and value of complaints filed at and violations
found by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and a list
of countries where the company has facilities or operations. 168 This
type of specific disclosure would be an improvement on the vague
"materiality" standard currently employed by the SEC. As is
demonstrated in Part V.B. of this Note, similar specific disclosure
requirements with respect to HTV/AIDS policies may also be worthy
of consideration, as they may be of substantial interest to investors in
certain, particularly foreign, companies.
2. The Williams Approach to Social Disclosure
Cynthia Williams, assistant professor at the University of
Illinois College of Law, argues that "the SEC's public interest
disclosure power is separate from and broader than its investor
protection disclosure power."'169 Although the SEC has not exercised
its ability to require companies to report on social data relating to the
public interest, she argues that such reporting can and should be
required by the SEC in proxy disclosure statements. 70 She relies on
the history of the legislation itself in support of her argument that a
major congressional aim in enacting the 1934 Act was to encourage
71
and induce public accountability among corporate management.l
Finally, she concludes that despite the SEC's refusal to require broad
social disclosure in the past, such disclosure should today be required,
as this information would now be deemed "material" by many
172
investors.

165. Id.
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CSWG Proposed Expanded SEC Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements,
reprinted in Michelle Chan-Fishel, After Enron: How Accounting and SEC Reform can
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"Materiality" is a relative term whose definition will change over
time. Recent events suggest that investors may be increasingly
concerned with disclosures that relate more to corporate integrity and
accountability than the mere numbers. Since the publication of
Professor Williams' articles, corporate accountability has become a
prevalent issue in the public conscience. With the collapse of Enron
and other corporate mismanagement scandals involving companies
like Tyco and Worldcom, the demand for corporate transparency is at
an all-time high. 173 In light of these corporate calamities, the
(rather than purely
discussion of the need for social and ethical
174
financial) accountability is as relevant as ever.
This shift in priorities can be seen in investment trends. People
invested $97 billion in so-called "socially responsible" mutual funds in
1997, thus demonstrating that investors are concerned with social as
well as financial responsibility. 175 Therefore, Williams' argument that
social disclosure would be considered "material" 176 to the average
investor is more persuasive than ever in the current economic and
social climate. Arthur Levitt, former chairperson of the SEC, would
likely agree with Williams' assertion. As he stated, "if a country does
not have a reputation for strong corporate governance practices,
capital will flow elsewhere. If investors are not confident with the
level of disclosure, capital will flow elsewhere. If a country opts for lax
177
accounting and reporting standards, capital will flow elsewhere.
In the context of South Africa, reporting standards under which
companies may hide from investors the impact of the AIDS virus on
their businesses would arguably be considered "lax."
A recent critique of Williams' argument points out that rarely
are shareholders motivated either purely by ethics or purely by the
bottom line. 178 This dichotomy is not necessary, however, to support
Williams' basic assertion because social disclosures usually have
some impact (whether material or not) on finances. Indeed, "[h]ippie
or yuppie, the shareholder needs to know if a firm is a toxic polluter
so that she can divest herself of the moral179guilt or the Superfund
liability-in-waiting, whichever concerns her."

Colleen DeBaise, CorporateGovernance Law is the Rage, WALL ST. J., Sept.
173.
1, 2004, at B7; see also Bob Greifeld, The View from Nasdaq, WALL ST. J., July 30,
2004, at A10.
174.

Id.

Williams, supra note 111, at 1267.
175.
For SEC purposes, materiality is defined as anything "substantially likely
176.
to be considered significant by a reasonable investor." Id. at 1268.
KING REPORT, supra note 6, § 16 (quoting Arthur Levitt).
177.
Note, Should the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements?, 115
178.
HARv. L. REV. 1433, 1439 (2002) [hereinafter Nonfinancial Disclosure].
Id. at 1436.
179.
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The Social Investment Forum tracks trends in socially
responsible investing.' 80 It follows investors who engage in
"screening," the process of "including, excluding, or evaluating
publicly traded securities from investment portfolios or mutual funds
based on social and/or environmental criteria. 1 8 1 Such investors seek
out "operations that respect human rights around the world" and,
conversely, "avoid . . . companies whose products and business
practices are harmful. 18 2 The report calculated investments of $2.14
trillion in socially screened portfolios in 2003, up seven percent from
2001.183 These social investors seek out companies that have met
certain criteria of "Corporate Social Responsibility."'1 4 From 1995 to
2003, socially responsible investment assets grew by 240 percent,
compared to 174 percent growth for investments overall during the
same time period.' 85 It is evident that social reporting has become
increasingly important to U.S. investors in recent years. The SEC
should thus reform its disclosure rules to allow shareholders to make
their investment decisions with the body of knowledge that they deem
"material" by today's more socially responsible standards.
B. Implementing a Disclosure Requirement: Hess'Plan of Action
David Hess argues for social reporting requirements in the
United States.18 6
His plan of action for implementing such
regulations follows fairly closely the steps that have already been
taken in South Africa. He suggests a first stage involving nonmandatory legislation that would "encourage companies to
experiment with social reporting and work with accounting
institutions to gain the practical experience necessary to develop the
needed standards.' ' 8 7 The JSE's new listing requirements follow this
model.' 8 8 A listed company is given ample discretion to choose what it
wants to disclose under the circumstances.' 8 9 Accordingly, Hess
stresses the need to allow flexibility in the reporting requirements
and to acknowledge that each social report may vary widely

180.
Report on Socially Responsible Investment Trends in the United States,
Social Investment Forum, Dec. 2003, available at, http://www.socialinvest.org/areas
research/trends/sritrends-report_2003.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
181.
Id. at 9.
182.
Id.
183.
Id. at 4.
184.
Id. at 9.
185.
Id. at 4.
186.
Hess, supra note 102, at 41.
187.
Id. at 65.
188.
See KING REPORT, supra note 6, § 5.1.4.
189.
Id.; see also Temkin, supra note 99.
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depending on the nature of the company filing the report. 190 Finally,
Hess proposes that after this "experimental" period, companies of a
certain size should be required to participate in social reporting. 191
He advocates following the SEC's size threshold for its registration
and reporting requirements-that any corporation with 500 or more
shareholders and more than $5 million in assets must comply. 192 The
JSE's listing requirements are already similar to Hess' proposal in
that listed companies must meet certain size requirements. 193 Hess'
argument is useful, however, in considering what steps South Africa
could take toward making the reporting requirement a legal one,
imposed by the Financial Services Board, a governmental entity,
rather than merely a requirement imposed by individual stock
exchanges like the JSE.

VI. ARGUMENT

A. Social ReportingIs Material to U.S. Investors
The realization that there are social disclosures that will affect
shareholders' investment decisions should resonate with the SEC and
U.S. corporations. Admittedly, HIV/AIDS is not now so pervasive in
U.S. society as to warrant prevalence reporting requirements on all
publicly traded domestic companies. But there are parallel concerns
in U.S. society that, while perhaps not as polemic as AIDS, could
arouse the same kind of investor scrutiny and selectivity if reported
routinely. For example, corporate funding of political campaigns, gun
control laws, abortion, and compliance with environmental
regulations are all potential areas of material interest for either the
socially conscious or the fiscally responsible investor. In answer to the
query of why corporations should be required to be concerned with
their social performance in areas such as these, Professor David Hess
responds: "The simple answer ...

is that society, and in particular the

marketplace, expects and demands it. A recent survey found that
ninety-five percent of Americans disagreed with the view that the
1 94
only responsibility of business is to increase profits."'
As an example, one author notes that Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) data relating to worker fatalities,
absenteeism and accidents provide a good indication of a company's

Hess, supra note 102, at 66.
190.
Id.
191.
192.
Id. at 66-67.
193.
See Guidelines to Listing on the JSE, at http://www.jse.co.za/informational/
guideline/guidelines_05072004.doc (last visted Sept. 26, 2004).
194.
Hess, supra note 102 at 43.
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risk management strategies. 195 But, since companies are not required
to report this data to shareholders, they are effectively immune to
shareholder reprimand and will likely perpetuate unsafe working
conditions. 196 Losses in productivity and liabilities incurred as a
result hurt both the workers affected and the shareholders'
investments. 19 7 Where deplorable working conditions have been
disclosed to shareholders through the media, as happened with the
so-called Nike "sweatshops," companies have been pressured into
changing their business practices. 198 It follows, then, that despite the
absence of a legal requirement to disclose social data like these,
shareholders do indeed find them "material" and will modify their
investment strategies accordingly. Examples like this show that even
when a corporation is in technical compliance with the law, its
shareholders may find its compliance (or lack thereof) with other
social norms equally important.
A recent Wall Street Journal article noted that events such as
the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, South Africa's apartheid
regime, and the support of terrorism by foreign oil companies have all
influenced investor decisions. 199 While the SEC first ignored the
contention that the social ventures of a company would be of any
material interest to an investor, a divestment campaign against these
"bad actors" proved successful.2 00 As a result, companies supporting
terrorism and regimes abusive to human rights saw drops in their
stock values. 20 1 In response, the SEC appears to have changed its
tune-at least in the area of U.S. foreign policy. Its chairman noted in
2001 that "[olur aim is to make available to investors additional
information about situations in which the material proceeds of an
offering could-however indirectly-benefit countries, governments,

Chan-Fishel, supra note 164, at 10966.
195.
Id.
196.
Id.
197.
Hess, supranote 102, at 44-45.
198.
Roger W. Robinson, Jr., Are You Investing in Rogue States?, WALL ST. J.,
199.
July 6, 2001, at A8.
The nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, for example, elevated the
importance of environmental risk factors in the markets. Other 'socially
responsible' investment guidelines have caused many state public pension
funds to eschew stocks issued by tobacco, gun and alcohol concerns. The
divestment campaign directs against South African apartheid is, to many, a
model for the current market activism aimed at the genocide-, slavery-, and
terrorist-sponsoring Sudanese government-and the foreign oil companies like
Talisman whose investments are providing the Khartoum regime with
economic life-support.
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201.
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or entities that, as a matter of U.S. foreign policy, are off-limits to
U.S. companies. ' 202 The Director of the SEC's Division of Corporate
Finance also conceded that "[a] reasonable investor would likely
consider it significant that a foreign company raising capital in the
U.S. markets has business relationships with countries, governments
or entities with which any U.S. company would be prohibited from
'20 3
dealing because of U.S. economic sanctions.
In the wake of Enron's collapse and similar corporate scandals,
disclosure in general is a hot topic in the United States. Michelle
Chan-Fishel, 20 4 coordinator of the Green Investments program at
Friends of the Earth-U.S., notes that
[t]he Enron case .. .demonstrates that investors needed fair and full
disclosure of both financial as well as nonfinancial data. Indeed,
inadequate reporting of nonfinancial information such as . . . the
amount and recipients of political campaign contributions (not
currently required by the SEC), were at the core of many problems
205
highlighted by the Enron case.

Some U.S. companies are already making this kind of disclosure work
for them. Hess notes that The Body Shop International and Ben and
Jerry's Homemade, Inc. are two companies that have included
categories like these in annual reports. 20 6 One of the great benefits of
the social reports is an increase in transparency and accountability to
207
shareholders.
B. South Africa as a Case Study for Materiality
Because of the magnitude of the AIDS crisis in South Africa and
the public demand for corporations to do their fair share to help, U.S.
investors should watch closely to see whether the moral pressure on
these companies is sufficient to compel preventive and treatmentoriented expenditures. Shareholder response to such disclosure is an
indication of how "material" investors do perceive these social data to
be both financially and morally relevant. Pressure on reluctant
companies is likely to be successful only if the company believes it is
in jeopardy of losing shareholder support. As it stands, the JSE
regulations only require companies to report their response to the

202.
Id. (quoting letter from SEC Chairman, Laura Unger, to Congress (internal
quotes omitted)).
203.
Nonfinancial Disclosure, supra note 178, at 1434 (quoting Memorandum
from David B.H. Martin, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC, to Laura
Unger, Acting Chair, SEC (May 8, 2001).
204.
Chan-Fishel, supra note 164, at 10965 FN*.
205.
Id. at 10965 (emphasis added; parenthesis in original).
206.
Id. at 72-79.
207.
Id. at 83.
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AIDS epidemic in their workplace, rather than actually requiring any
particular responsive action.208 If such disclosure has a significant
effect on investments, the social data will evidently be "substantially
considered significant by a reasonable investor," or
likely to be
"material. '209 Thus, by the SEC's definition of materiality, this type of
social data can and should be disclosed to investors. 210 Furthermore,
in South Africa, the discovery that such reporting has a significant
effect on shareholder investing will likely either encourage or
discourage (depending on the investors' reactions) companies to do
more in the way of preventing and treating the disease. Such
proactive measures may one day be important enough to also be
included as requirements for listing.
Although only eight African companies are listed on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), seven of those are South African
companies.2 11 Furthermore, three of the companies are gold mines
and the fourth is primarily concerned with investments in the mining
industry. 212 Because the mines depend primarily on a workforce
derived from a particularly high-risk segment of the population, the
AIDS epidemic is particularly relevant for U.S. investors in these
listed companies.2 13 More than twenty-three percent of workers in
the mining, metals processing, and agribusiness industries suffer
from the disease. 214 The cost of labor in these industries has risen
dramatically because of an increase in absenteeism and employee
turnover as a result of the disease. 2 15 As an example of this cost at its
worst, companies in Zambia and the Congo have resorted to training
and hiring two employees for every one needed, in anticipation that
one will die. 2 16 This threatens to stifle the trend of globalization, as
the once-alluring prospect of cheaper labor in developing countries is
2 17
dwindling.
Outside of the workforce itself, the well-being of South African
companies is also threatened by the reduced demand for goods and
218
Families that once had
services that has resulted from the disease.

KING REPORT, supra note 6, § 5.1.4.
208.
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discretionary income are now forced to save their money to pay for
medical treatments and make up for the lost wages of a sick
breadwinner. 2 19 The costs associated with an infected workforce and
decreased demand are not unique to South Africa. 220 Because the
costs of the disease are not immediate (most HIV-infected workers
will not become a financial burden until five to ten years after
infection), countries in which AIDS is rapidly spreading have not yet
evaluated how AIDS affects the cost of doing business. 221 The costs of
doing business in South Africa have escalated dramatically and can
no longer be ignored. The JSE has determined that AIDS prevalence
and treatment are now matters that should be considered relevant to
the average investor. While investors may today be warned against
the financial risks inherent in South African investments, similar
companies in other AIDS-ravaged countries are seeming to follow
22 2
suit.
South Africa, with its combination of sophisticated publicly listed
companies and an extremely high AIDS prevalence rate among the
general population, provides the perfect case study for assessing
investor demand for AIDS-related disclosure. But while South Africa
may be the first country to provide such a poignant example, it will
not be the only country to encounter such results. AIDS is not only an
African disease. As of the end of 2003, between ten and twenty
percent of the world's AIDS cases were found in Asia, and India had
the greatest number of infected individuals at around 4 million
cases. 22 3 As the recent rapid increase in infection rates in India and
Russia indicates, the rising costs of AIDS will soon be a matter of the
utmost importance for investors in markets worldwide. The World
Health Organization (WHO) now estimates that forty million people
worldwide are infected with HIV. 224 China reported a sixty-four
percent increase in infections during the first six months of 2001. It is
now estimated that one million Chinese are infected with AIDS and
that only about ten percent of individuals know they are infected. 2 25
If drastic measures are not taken to curtail the negative effects of

219.
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220.
Id. at 84.
221.
Id. at 87.
222.
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223.
Mieko Nishimizu, AIDS and the Development Paradigm in India, Bus.
LINE, India, Oct. 7, 2002, available at http://lnwebl8.worldbank.org/SAR/sa.nsf/
Countries/India. Mieko Nishimuzu is Vice President of the South Asian Region of the
World Bank. Id.
224.
Facts About Hi1V/AIDS-South-East Asia Region, World Health
Organization, available at http://w3.whosea.org/hivaids/factl.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2004).
225.
Reuters, Few in China Aware They May Have AIDS, MSNBC.coM, Mar. 2,
2004, availableat http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id4428619.
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both of these factors, it is estimated that the number of infected
Chinese could rise to ten million by 2010.226 Infection rates are
growing the fastest in Eastern Europe, where 1.5 million people are
now HIV-positive (up from only 30,000 in 1995).227 It is estimated
that one in every 100 adults living in Russia, Estonia, and the
2 28
Ukraine are infected with AIDS.
The bottom line is that AIDS reporting should be of the utmost
concern for the socially conscious as well as the fiscally responsible
investor in international corporations. All of the three countries in
which AIDS is growing most rapidly (China, India, and Russia) have
companies listed on the NYSE. 229 Not only is a company's response to
AIDS in its workforce a measure of its ethical responsibility, it is
simply good business. 230 The U.S.'s stock exchanges should take their
lead from the JSE in considering an expansion of disclosure
requirements as a prerequisite for listing. In light of the enormous
costs associated with AIDS, the exchanges should recognize the
importance that investors in foreign corporations may place on a
company's response to the disease. The disease has costs that go well
beyond the physical well-being of an infected individual and, indeed,
23
reach into the portfolio of an investor. 1
C. The SEC Has Authority to Introduce Social Reporting
Requirements
1. The SEC Has Authority to Require Social Disclosure on Issues
That Will Have a Material Financial Impact on the Health of a
Company
AIDS is a particularly unique issue for investors because data
that are known today can have an enormous effect on the future
health of the company. 2 32 The financial implications of the disease
are not, however, realized until five to ten years later. 23 3 This fate can
be substantially altered depending on the company's response to the
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Press Release,WHOJUNAIDS/UNICEF, AIDS Threat Growing Throughout
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HIV Prevention and Treatment Programmes (Feb. 23, 2004), available at
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epidemic.2 3 4 A company that opts to adopt treatment and preventive
programs will have a better future outlook even though its portfolios
2 35
in the short run may suffer from the overhead of such programs.
The long-term investor will likely consider such measures material to
his or her investment strategy.236 As Professor Alan Whiteside,
Director of Health Economics and HIV/AIDS Research at Natal
University notes, "[w]e are working on two curves, the HIV curve and
the AIDS curve. The HIV curve is growing, the AIDS curve is still to
come." 23 7 Because the effect of HIV/AIDS on a company's workforce,
along with the company's response to the disease, is a material
consideration for many investors in certain hard-hit areas, the SEC
has the authority to require disclosure of this information in such a
company's annual report.
2. The SEC Has Authority to Require Social Disclosures Even if
There Is No Material Financial Impact on a Company
The financial implications of the AIDS epidemic should satisfy
the SEC's current "bottom line" standard of materiality. Because the
disease will substantially affect a company's wage bill, it will affect
investors' financial interests. This is not the only reason why the
reporting requirement should be imposed, however. As the SEC found
in its response to those investors who did not want to be affiliated
with so-called "bad actors," investors care about more than simply
238
their financial outlook.
Steps have been taken to promote disclosure with an aim toward
''ensuring transparency of material information so as to enable
individual and institutional investors to make more informed
decisions." 23 9 These enhanced disclosure requirements should also
include those matters that may not only affect an investor's financial
returns, but are also material to his moral conscience.
Many
investors are wary of being morally linked to a company engaged in
practices with which they do not agree. 240 It may be of material
interest to an investor that a company that employs up to thirty
percent AIDS-infected workers is actively engaged in the treatment
and prevention of the epidemic. Just as the SEC acknowledged its
ability to notify investors of a company's "bad actions" in relation to
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endeavors that conflict with U.S. foreign policy, it also has the ability
to notify investors of a company's practices that are substantially
2
likely to conflict with his or her personal ethos. 41
3. How to Implement a Social Disclosure Requirement
The most seamless way to introduce social reporting
requirements would be to follow a voluntary formula, like that
proposed by Hess. As time and experience demonstrate which social
issues are the most material to investors, these issues should then be
elevated to "mandatory" status. In South Africa, financial reporting is
currently optional for listed companies, but the JSE initially wanted
to make such reporting compulsory. Some predict that mandatory
242
financial disclosure is not far away for South African businesses.
Similarly, the SEC could make social disclosure optional until it can
ascertain the bearing that such disclosure has on investment
decisions.
Hess proposes dividing social reports into the following categories:
customers, employees, environment, franchisees, shareholders, and
suppliers. 243 Within these categories, employers would report on issues
such as wages, childcare, charitable contributions, compliance with
EPA standards, lawsuits filed, company investments, etc. 244 Hess sees
disclosure as the key means of getting information to the market.2 45 As
a consequence, he believes that legislation requiring social reporting is
simply a continuation of the theme of disclosure in federal securities
law of late.2 46 "[A] social report would not mandate that certain
predetermined outcomes be reached, but would instead require a
corporation to reflect on how its practices impact society and to open up
dialogues with the relevant stakeholders. 24 7 His plan is flexible in that
it provides companies with an incentive to make reforms in order to
avoid exposure of lax policies, without mandating any one particular
methodology.
AIDS prevention and treatment programs have potentially
significant long-term relevance for a company's overall health and
future stability. 248 Such an issue will be a likely candidate for the
mandatory disclosure requirement, especially in foreign corporations
in countries like South Africa, where infection rates are significantly
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higher than in the rest of the world. The time for enacting such a
requirement is now. As noted above, the true costs of the AIDS
epidemic on a company will not be apparent until the disease has
reached its critical stage among a workforce. 249 Long-term investors
should be interested in what a company is doing about AIDS now,
especially if the company is located in a country with high infection
rates. Of primary concern would be a company that uses mostly
unskilled labor, the population hardest hit by the epidemic in most
countries.
Whereas Hess argues for a company's elevation to "mandatory
disclosure" status to be determined by the size of a corporation and
the number of its investors, 250 it makes sense in the area of AIDS
prevention and treatment for disclosure to be predicated on the
prevalence of AIDS in the country and among the demographic
represented in the company's workforce. These factors should
adequately account for the interests of both socially minded and
fiscally responsible investors (of which most people are neither
uniquely one nor the other). These numbers are not always easy to
quantify, but they are becoming more and more readily available as
actuarial techniques improve and voluntary testing becomes cheaper
and easier to administer. 251 South Africa, as a leader in the area of
encouraging AIDS disclosure, provides a good benchmark.
VII. CONCLUSION

In sum, the SEC should follow the lead of the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange in determining that companies' policies and
procedures in AIDS reporting, treatment, and prevention are of
material importance both financially and socially to U.S. investors in
foreign corporations located in countries where the AIDS epidemic is
prevalent. Because the AIDS epidemic is growing at alarming rates in
countries where publicly traded companies derive a large portion of
their workforces, U.S. investors should be interested and concerned
over what these companies are doing about the disease. Not only is
such disclosure good for a company's social good-will value, but
studies show that it is also good for a company's bottom line.
Just as it took a large number of deaths ...

including those of ...

Rock

Hudson and Arthur Ashe . . . to focus attention on the problem in the
United States, large death tolls may be necessary to shock people into
noticing the epidemic in countries outside of Africa. But by then, it will

249.
250.
251.

Id.
Hess, supra note 102, at 66.
Rosen et al., supra note 34, at 82-84.

2004]

1509

AIDS IS RISKY BUSINESS
be too late for companies and investors-not to mention employees,
252
families and communities.
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